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ARTICLE
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: AN
OVERVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE AND




This paper is intended to provide context for the discussion on mitigat-
ing risks in cross-border investment. It focuses on the primary adjudicative
mechanism to address investor grievances against a host State: Investor-
State dispute settlement (ISDS). ISDS is the right given to a foreign inves-
tor to initiate dispute settlement proceedings with a sovereign State, most
commonly through international arbitration. It is a unique right given to
private persons and entities to claim a remedy against the host State in
which they invested.
The cornerstone of ISDS is the written consent of both parties to the
dispute. State consent may be found in international investment agreements
(IIAs), in contracts between a foreign investor and host State, and in the
domestic investment laws of host States. IIAs are the most common basis of
consent invoked in ISDS cases and are the foundation for about seventy-
five percent of all known cases.1 These agreements include commitments
between two (or more) States to treat foreign investors of the other signa-
* This article is based on a lecture delivered at the University of St. Thomas School of Law
on February 21, 2020.
** Meg Kinnear is the Secretary-General of the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID). Kinnear joined ICSID in June 2009. Previously, she worked as Senior
General Counsel (2006–2009) and Director General of the Trade Law Bureau of Canada
(1999–2006). Prior to this, Ms. Kinnear also worked as the Executive Assistant to the Deputy
Minister of Justice of Canada (1996–1999) and Counsel at the Civil Litigation Section of the
Canadian Department of Justice (1984–1996).
1. See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., THE ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS 11
(Issue 2020-2), for a profile of the ICSID caseload, including the basis of consent invoked in
ICSID cases.
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tory State in accordance with certain standards of treatment. The commit-
ments often encompass a promise not to expropriate an investment without
fair compensation, not to discriminate on the basis of foreign nationality, or
not to impose certain performance requirements or local content rules. In-
vestment agreements often oblige States to treat foreign investors fairly and
equitably, and to allow the transfer of funds in and out of the host State.
ISDS provisions in these agreements also provide a remedy to an aggrieved
investor. If a State is found in breach of the substantive obligations in the
treaty, it may be found liable for damages by a tribunal and may receive
compensation guided by principles such as “full reparation,” “adequate
compensation,” and “fair market value.” Although the framework of ISDS
has remained constant in the last fifty years, the number of treaties and
ISDS cases under treaties have increased, while the applicable procedures
have adapted to party demands for increased transparency about the pro-
cess, increased coherence in the jurisprudence, increased diversity among
arbitrators, and a reduction in the time and cost involved in resolving a
conflict.
II. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
The treaties, contracts, and laws that govern cross-border investment—
and their dispute settlement provisions—are complemented by the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the leading
forum for ISDS cases. ICSID was developed by the Executive Directors of
the World Bank in the 1960s and was formally established in 1966 by the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention).2 ICSID is one of the five
organizations that comprise the World Bank Group, along with the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development,  International Develop-
ment Association, International Finance Corporation, and Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency.3 In contrast to the other organizations of the
World Bank Group, ICSID does not offer financial services or advice.
Rather, it is an impartial institution that provides rules of procedure for
resolving international investment disputes—through arbitration, concilia-
tion, and fact-finding—and extensive administrative support to the parties
and tribunals.
In terms of structure, ICSID is comprised of an Administrative Council
and a Secretariat. Each ICSID Contracting State has one seat on the Admin-
2. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14,
1966).
3. About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited
Oct. 16, 2020).
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istrative Council and one vote on matters tabled before the Council.4 As of
June 9, 2020, there are 155 ICSID Contracting States—the term given to
States that have ratified the ICSID Convention.5 Djibouti is the latest State
to ratify the Convention.6 The Administrative Council plays no role in the
administration of individual cases. Rather, its responsibilities relate to the
functioning of the Centre as a whole, such as adopting administrative and
financial regulations for ICSID, electing the ICSID Secretary-General, and
approving ICSID’s annual budget.7 The ICSID Secretariat manages the
day-to-day functioning of the Centre. This includes acting as the registrar in
proceedings, assisting with the constitution of tribunals and ad hoc commit-
tees, supporting parties and tribunals on aspects of ICSID procedure, or-
ganizing and assisting with hearings, and administering the finances of
cases.
Since its establishment, ICSID has administered over seventy percent
of all known ISDS cases.8 The Centre’s caseload has grown significantly
over the last three decades, in a trend that correlates with the growth in IIAs
and foreign investment more generally.















































































GLOBAL FDI INFLOWS CUMULATIVE # OF IIAs
4. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 2, at 164, 166.
5. Resources, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/re
sources/rules-and-regulations/convention/overview (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
6. Djibouti Ratifies the ICSID Convention, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS.
(June 9, 2020), https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/djibouti-ratifies-icsid-
convention.
7. Role of Member States, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., https://icsid.world
bank.org/about/member-states/role-of-member-states (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
8. United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases
Pass the 1,000 Mark: Cases and Outcomes in 2019, IIA ISSUES NOTE, July 2020, at 2.
9. United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Data Center, UNCTAD STAT, https://
unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2020); United
Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., International Investment Agreements Navigator, INV.
POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
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III. THE PURPOSE AND ROOTS OF IIAS AND ISDS
IIAs seek to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) by enhancing
investment climates, including by providing access to ICSID for the peace-
ful settlement of investment disputes. They are in part a reflection of the
desire of States to attract FDI as a means to finance new projects, create
jobs, and share technology and know-how in their jurisdiction.
IIAs and ISDS are also an answer to practical challenges in resolving
cross-border investment disputes. Historically, foreign investors and their
investments were subject to the jurisdiction of the host State, meaning
claims had to be initiated in domestic courts. But foreign investors poten-
tially faced legal and political hurdles that were often greater—or at least
different—from those of a local investor, which made the host State less
attractive to foreign investors.10 Concerns included claims of absolute State
immunity, the adoption of the Calvo Doctrine in certain States preventing
foreign investors from invoking an international remedy prior to exhausting
domestic remedies,11 a lack of impartiality of local courts, and inefficien-
cies that made local courts an ineffective solution.12
At the same time, available remedies in international law were also
limited. Traditionally, aggrieved foreign investors sought diplomatic protec-
tion. This could take different forms, ranging from a diplomatic note by the
home State of the investor asking for the situation to be remedied to full
espousal of the claim by the home State. In practice, however, home States
are often reluctant to intervene—especially by taking on a legal claim
against another State—given the range of diplomatic interests that would
need to be weighed in parallel. Espousal of a claim by the home State is
particularly unlikely for smaller investors that are less of a strategic or eco-
nomic interest for the home State. Espousal is also subject to certain pre-
conditions, including that investors must have the nationality of the home
State (which poses a challenge when investment vehicles are multi-na-
tional), proved continuous nationality, and exhausted local remedies—
which may be a time-consuming and ineffective remedy.13
As such, it was in large part the absence of effective domestic and
international systems with jurisdiction that led to ISDS and ICSID. The
goal of these systems is to ensure that rights and obligations enshrined in
treaties are enforceable at the international level. The aim is also to de-
politicize investment disputes—thus eliminating one of the major draw-
10. CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, 11–19, (1st ed. 2008).
11. For further discussion, see id. at 16–19. The Calvo Doctrine provided that there could be
no international responsibility so long as the domestic judicial or administrative system offered a
recourse to the aggrieved foreign investor, and hence gave domestic courts exclusive jurisdiction
where such a remedy was available.
12. Id. at 15–16.
13. Id. at 27–33.
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backs of espousal—by ensuring the availability of a peaceful means of
dispute resolution directly between the host State and foreign investor.
As the network of IIAs and ISDS provisions has grown, researchers
have examined (and debated) their impact on FDI. Quantitative modeling
has found an overall positive correlation between IIAs and FDI, often
showing an increase in FDI in States that conclude IIAs.14 At the same
time, there are some examples of States with no IIAs but with increased
FDI, and these are cited by some as the “counter-factual” in this debate. It is
likely impossible to demonstrate empirically that IIAs always lead to in-
creased FDI given the numerous factors that influence foreign investment
patterns and the variations in IIAs. Nonetheless, most States see IIAs and
ISDS as a key part of their treaty programs and broader investment policy.
IV. TRENDS IN IIAS
IIAs have evolved considerably since their genesis in the late 1950s
and 1960s. The trend has been towards longer, more detailed agreements,
with more precise definitions of obligations, increasingly specific procedu-
ral requirements, and occasionally more stringent preconditions to acces-
sing ISDS procedures. This trend is accompanied by—and informed by—
the increased use of model investment treaties that States use as the tem-
plate for negotiation. Model IIAs have proliferated greatly since the
2000s—with over eighty model treaties documented by UNCTAD and
many others under development.15
There has also been growth in regional agreements (i.e., the Domini-
can Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement), plurilateral agree-
ments (i.e., the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership), and sectoral agreements (i.e., the Energy Charter
Treaty). However, States have not agreed on global multilateral investment
obligations. Negotiations at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) over a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
concluded in 1998 without agreement on the text, and currently a global
multilateral treaty is not under negotiation.16
Also notable are the geographic trends in investment-treaty making.
While the first generation of treaties were primarily between developed and
developing countries (i.e., North-South agreements), the last several de-
cades have seen an increase in North-North, South-South and other combi-
14. See, e.g., Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase For-
eign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEv. 1567, 1582 (2005).
15. United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., International Investment Agreements
Monitor – Model Agreements, INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/model-agreements (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
16. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., https://
www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.
htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
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nations. In turn, more variety in treaty partners leads to more variety in the
claimants and respondents in ISDS cases. This is evident in the ICSID
caseload, with claimants increasingly coming from emerging and develop-
ing economies.17
Potential emerging trends in investment agreements also include:
• Corporate Social Responsibility clauses in IIAs: Inclusion of
Corporate Social Responsibility clauses is not yet widespread,
although it is a feature of some newer agreements.18
• Multilateral Investment Court: The concept of a court-based
model for ISDS—as an alternative to international arbitra-
tion—is under discussion in multilateral fora, with the Euro-
pean Union as a leading proponent. Its design is one of many
topics of discussion amongst delegations to United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL)
Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform.19
• Increased use of Investment Contracts: Some States may re-
turn to “one-off” investment contracts offering a remedy only
to the other contracting party, as opposed to the treaty model
that offers a remedy to all who fall within its jurisdictional
limits. While the contractual offer limits the potential number
of claimants, it likely also disfavors small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) who are less able to negotiate such agree-
ments or to negotiate necessary terms in such agreements.
V. TRENDS IN ISDS
In parallel with the evolution of IIAs, the procedure of investor-State
dispute settlement has seen significant modernization. This is an outcome of
changes to the dispute settlement provisions of IIAs, updates to the institu-
tional rules of procedure used in ISDS—such as those of ICSID—and soft-
law norms that reflect best practices.
A. Transparency
A focus on transparency in ISDS proceedings—which encompasses
public access to proceedings and case-related awards, decisions, and or-
ders—began in the 1990s as the number of ISDS cases increased. Older
17. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., supra note 1 (setting forth statistics which
classify the geographic regions based on the World Bank’s regional system, including World
Bank donor countries); Where We Work, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/where-we-
work (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
18. See, e.g., Yulia Levashova, Imposing Conditions on Investor Protection: A Role of Inves-
tors Due Diligence, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 20, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.
com/2019/06/20/imposing-conditions-on-investor-protection-a-role-of-investors-due-diligence.
19. See generally Standing First Instance and Appeal Investment Court, with Full-Time
Judges, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/standing (last visited Oct.
23, 2020).
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generation treaties were often silent on the question of transparency or re-
quired confidentiality. But starting with the investment chapter (Chapter 11)
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), States increas-
ingly undertook to publish case-related materials, provide public access to
hearings, and allow the participation of non-disputing parties.20
Meanwhile, ISDS rules of procedure have also made proceedings more
transparent. The first notable step in this direction was in 2006 when ICSID
amended its procedural rules. Under the revision of 2006, ICSID was re-
quired to publish excerpts of awards if the parties did not consent to publi-
cation, allow the public to attend hearings (unless a party objected), and
Tribunals could allow a non-disputing party to file a written submission if it
assisted the Tribunal in deciding a relevant factual or legal issue.21 Rules on
transparency in the UNCITRAL Rules—which are the second most com-
monly used procedural rules for ISDS, after those of ICSID—were adopted
in 2014.22 This was followed by the entry into force of the Mauritius Con-
vention in 2017. States ratifying the Mauritius Convention commit to apply-
ing the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency to all arbitrations initiated
pursuant to investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014. To date,
twenty-three countries have signed the Convention, and six have ratified
it.23
Currently, ICSID is discussing further rule changes on transparency as
part of a second—and much broader—amendment to its rules addressing
transparency of proceedings.24 Chapter X of the proposed new rules would
further enhance access to case-related awards, decisions, and orders. This
chapter includes rules on redaction and publication of awards, decisions,
orders, and documents filed in a proceeding. It allows the public to observe
hearings unless a party objects, includes a definition of confidential or pro-
tected information for the purposes of public disclosure, and permits sub-
missions by non-disputing parties and participation by the non-disputing
treaty party.25
20. For an overview on transparency in ISDS, see U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., TRANS-
PARENCY: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II (2012).
21. Aurelia Antonietti, The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the
Additional Facility Rules, 21 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 427, 433, 435, 442 (2006).
22. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVES-
TOR-STATE ARBITRATION (2014).
23. United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration,
opened for signature Mar. 17, 2015, United Nations Treaty Collection Registration No. 54749.
24. ICSID Rules and Regulations Amendment Process, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPS., https://icsid-archive.worldbank.org/en/amendments (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
25. For the latest proposals, see Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps., Working Paper #4:
Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 64–68 (Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps.,
Working Paper No. 4, 2020), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_4_Vol_1_En.pdf.
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B. Consistency in Jurisprudence
Consistency in ISDS decision-making also came under scrutiny as case
numbers grew in the 1990s and awards increasingly entered the public do-
main. This was motivated by concern among some commentators that dif-
fering interpretations of key standards in IIA—such as Fair and Equitable
Treatment and Most-favored Nation Treatment—were a cause of unpredict-
ability for States and foreign investors.26 Importantly, there is no rule of
precedent in international arbitration, so tribunals are not bound by the deci-
sions of previous tribunals. However, parties will refer to previous deci-
sions in their pleadings, and tribunals generally try to create a
“jurisprudence constante.”27 Structural reforms are also being discussed as
a means to enhance consistency. One option is an appeals mechanism for
investor-State disputes. Another is a court-like system, as the EU has pro-
posed, as noted above.
It is important to note that a certain amount of variance in jurispru-
dence is to be expected, given that tribunals make fact-based determinations
on a case-by-case basis. But consistency can be supported in investment
arbitration, most notably through transparency. When parties and tribunals
have access to previous decisions, they are able to consider interpretation of
similar provisions in other cases.
C. Arbitrator Qualifications, Impartiality, and Diversity
A number of issues related to arbitrators in ISDS cases have garnered
attention. One relates to the qualifications of party-appointed arbitrators. A
second is with respect to ensuring impartiality and absence of conflicts of
interest. A third is on the diversity of arbitrators—i.e., in terms of gender,
and national and legal background—of those who serve on tribunals.
It is important to note that, as a default in most investment arbitration,
each party selects an arbitrator, and they agree on the third, presiding arbi-
trator.28 As such, parties are empowered to select individuals that they be-
lieve will have good judgment and will settle the dispute fairly and
impartially. In ICSID cases, arbitrators also have an obligation to make a
declaration of independence and impartiality—and report any changes in
26. See, e.g., Chester Brown, Federico Ortino & Julian Arato, Lack of Consistency and Co-
herence in the Interpretation of Legal Issues, EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/
lack-of-consistency-and-coherence-in-the-interpretation-of-legal-issues.
27. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Guled Yusuf, Precedent & Jurisprudence Constante, in BUILD-
ING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF ICSID 71–81 (Meg Kinnear et al.
eds., 2016).
28. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, supra note 2, at 184.
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circumstance that has a bearing on an arbitrator’s impartiality throughout
the life of the case.29
On May 1, 2020, the ICSID and UNCITRAL secretariats also pub-
lished a draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators.30 The draft is intended for
discussion in the context of the work of UNCITRAL Working Group III
(ISDS reform) and the process underway to amend ICSID’s rules of proce-
dure. The draft Code establishes the basic duties of an arbitrator to be inde-
pendent and impartial, to disclose any matter that could reasonably affect
their independence or impartiality, to maintain high standards of integrity
and fairness, to ensure their availability to act in a timely manner, and to
retain the confidentiality of non-public information obtained in the course
of the proceedings. Article 12 requires voluntary compliance with the Code
and applies the disqualification and removal procedures of the applicable
rules.
The diversity of arbitrators has clearly improved in recent years, al-
though more work remains to be done. ICSID helps advance this agenda on
a number of fronts: proposing qualified nominees from different States, pro-
posing first-time nominees and female nominees to parties when they are
selecting tribunal members, encouraging ICSID Member States to be mind-
ful of diversity when appointing candidates to the ICSID Panels of Arbitra-
tors and of Conciliators, and regularly publishing statistics concerning the
diversity of appointed arbitrators in ICSID cases.31
D. Time and Cost
All parties share an interest in a time- and cost-efficient dispute resolu-
tion process. At the same time, ISDS cases are often complex and high-
stake disputes, which is reflected in the time and cost they take to resolve.
The average duration of investment disputes is close to four years, and the
average cost per party is between $4–6 million USD.32 All those involved
in cases—i.e., parties, tribunals, and administering institutions—have a role
to play in ensuring that cases are no more time and cost-intensive than nec-
essary, while maintaining due process. For its part, ICSID is committed to
ensuring its rules of procedure and case-administration practices are sup-
portive of an efficient process.
29. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATION AND
RULES 106 (2006).
30. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps. & United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law,
Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators (May 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
31. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., supra note 1, at 18–20.
32. Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Cost, Duration
and Size of Claims All Show Steady Increase, ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 14, 2017), https://
www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/investment-treaty-arbitration-
cost-duration-and-size-of-claims-all-show-steady-increase.
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Part of the answer to reducing cost and time is ensuring that new tech-
nology is leveraged effectively in cases. Towards that end, ICSID recently
made all case filings electronic, and offers parties a range of options for
virtual hearings. ICSID has also proposed a number of changes to its rules
of procedure to reduce the time and cost of proceedings, which are currently
under discussion with ICSID Member States. For example, the proposed
amended rules encourage tribunals to be active case managers. This in-
cludes deciding when to convene a case management conference to address
certain issues in dispute or decide a procedural matter. The proposed rules
also introduce a range of new or shorter timelines for procedural steps in its
regular arbitration rules, and even shorter timelines in a new set of expe-
dited rules. The expedited arbitration rules are available with the consent of
the parties, and once adopted, would reduce the length of a case by roughly
half. The expedited rules are a flexible option for parties and intended for
less complex cases or those involving small and mid-size enterprises.33
Finally, ICSID offers a range of other (non-arbitration) mechanisms
for dispute resolution, including mediation, conciliation, and fact-finding.34
Applied in the right circumstances, these alternative dispute resolution tools
have been effective in helping parties find an amicable settlement to their
dispute at less cost than arbitration or litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
International investment law has been a remarkably fast-moving area
of international law, both in terms of the substantive law and dispute resolu-
tion procedures. This will most likely continue to be the trend going for-
ward. As noted, States are introducing innovative provisions in their new
model IIAs, often with an eye to ensuring these treaties are aligned with
broader sustainable development goals. In parallel, States and other inter-
ested stakeholders are involved in discussions on the reform of the rules of
procedure for investment dispute resolution, including at ICSID and UNCI-
TRAL. Nonetheless, the underlying goal has remained constant now for
over fifty years—to ensure an effective means to resolve international in-
vestment disputes to encourage foreign investment.
33. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps., supra note 25, at 33, 35–37, 45, 54, 61–62,
74–80 (particularly proposed Arbitration Rules 3, 9–12, 22, 31, 46, 58, and 75–86).
34. See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATION AND
RULES, 81–98 (2006) (conciliation rules); see also INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS.,
ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, 13–22, 23–42 (2006) (laying out Additional Facility Fact-
Finding Rules and Additional Facility Conciliation Rules); see also Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of
Inv. Disps., supra note 25, at 33, 35–37, 45, 54, 61–62, 74–80, 195–204, 215–26 (laying out
proposed amendments to conciliation rules, proposed stand-alone fact-finding rules, and proposed
mediation rules).
